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In The Coral the Court of Appeal considered the mechanics and the effect of
incorporating clauses 2 and 8 of the New York Produce Exchange [NYPE] form
into a bill of lading contract. Their deliberations were inconclusive, as the matter
came before them on an appeal against an application for summary judgment. But
their decision stands for a continuation of the line of authority in which the English
courts have tended to favour the use of clauses in bills of lading incorporating the
terms of charterparty I. The Court ruled firm! y, however, that a charterparty clause
which removes from the shipowner responsibility for loading and stowage and places
it on the charterer will be given effect as a definition of the scope of the contractual
service provided to the shipowner, in accordance with the rule in Pyrene v. Scindia.2
Such a scope of responsibility clause will not be rejected in the context of the bill
of lading for incompatibility with the carrier's obligations under common law or under
the Hague Visby Rules properly to load and stow the cargo.
The facts and proceedings
The Coral was chartered on the NYPE form, clause 8 of which provides, in relevant
part:
" .. charterers are to load, stow, trim and discharge the cargo at their expense
under the supervision of the Captain ... "
Clause 2 ofthe NYPE form makes related provisions to the effect that the charterers
are to provide the requisite dunnage and shifting boards but are to have use of any
such materials already on the ship.
A self-trimming bulk carrier, The Coral loaded at Durban a consignment of steel
in sheets for Trabzon in Turkey under bills of lading issued by the charterer on behalf
of the owner. The bills of lading contained a clause paramount incorporating the Hague-
Visby Rules and a clause stating:
* Balli Trading Ltd. v. Afabra Shipping Co. Ltd. (The "Coral") [1993] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 1.
t Thomas Miller P&I
1. See Adamastos Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Co. Ltd. [1959] A.C. 133; The Merak
[1965] P.223; The Annefield [1971] P.168; The Rena K [1978] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 545.
2. Infra. n.11
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"All terms and conditions, liberties and exceptions of the charterparty, dated
as overleaf, are herewith incorporated."
The steel was loaded in two parcels, each in a different hold. A surveyor appointed
by the shipowner's P&I Club attended the loading at Durban and found that all
reasonable precautions had been taken in handling and stowing the cargo. Both holds
also contained other cargo bound for the intermediate port of Diliskelisi.
The Diliskelisi cargo was duly discharged, but the steel sheet was not restowed.
As a result it may have been left partially unsupported in the half-empty holds. On
the voyage from Diliskelisi to Trabzon the ship ran into heavy weather (winds force
6 to 8) resulting in a collapse of stow, damaging approximately one-third of the steel
cargo.
The consignees brought an action against the shipowner and applied under Order
14 of the Rules of the Supreme Court for summary judgment against them on the
ground that they had no arguable defence. Sheen, J., gave the shippers liberty to
sign judgment for damages to be assessed. He held that the shipowner's defence turned
on a question of law, namely the interpretation of the charterparty clause when
incorporated by reference into the bill of lading, which question could and should
be determined on an application for summary judgment. He held that the clause meant
only that the stowage would be performed by the charterer and did not amount to
an allocation of responsibility for stowage as between the shipowner and the bill of
lading holder. At the time, his judgment caused a frisson of apprehension amongst
the legal advisers of shipowners, as appearing to presage a wave of applications for
summary judgment in cargo claims.
Summary judgment and questions of construction
The Court of Appeal reversed the decision of Sheen J., for one principal reason:
that the merits of the case ought not to have been determined on an application for
summary judgment. The Court agreed that if the interpretation of the charterparty
clause had been in favour of the consignees, then the shipowner had not raised an
arguable defence. But if the shipowner's interpretation had been correct, then further
factual issues would have remained to be determined at trial: in particular, whether
the ship was unfit to carry this type of cargo by reason of the shape of her holds,
as alleged by the consignees. For this reason they held that the proper construction
of the bill of lading contract ought not to have been determined on summary
judgment. 3 The case is therefore authority for the proposition that a question of
construction ought not to be determined on an application for summary judgment
unless such determination will be finally dispositive of the case one way or the other.
Thus the Court of Appeal had to decide merely whether the shipowner had an arguable
defence, and for that reason were guarded in their approach to the questions raised.
3. Supra. pp.8-9. especially p.9 col. 1.
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The shipowner contended that clauses 2 and 8 of the NYPE form when incorporated
into the bill of lading contract amounted to an agreement that the carrier would not
be responsible for stowage. The consignees contended that the clause did no more
than state that performance of the carrier's obligation properly and carefully to stow
would be delegated to the charterer.
Adopting the analysis in Scrutton, Article 34, two groups of issues may be discerned:
issues concerning the meaning of the charterparty clauses in the context of the bill
oflading; and issues concerning the consistency of the incorporated clauses with the
other terms of the bill of lading.4 It had been conceded by the consignees that the
wide words of incorporation were sufficient to apply to clauses 2 and 8 of the
charterparty.
The meaning issues
The general approach of the Court to the "meaning issues" was set out by Beldam
L.J.:
The clauses were ... directly germane to the shipment, cariage and delivery of
goods . . . and such causes may be treated as incorporated even though the precise
words may need some modification."5
In support of this he cited The Miramar, which is commonly thought to be authority
for the view that the House of Lords had set its face against verbal manipulation. 6
Although Lord Diplock (delivering the judgment of the House in that case) began
by undertaking to clarify to what extent, "if any", such verbal manipulation was
permissible, the only definitive pronouncement his judgment yielded is that set out
in the footnote which merely establishes that there is no presumption in favour of
manipulation. There are suggestions that he might have been inclined to allow verbal
manipulation if there were a "business reason" to do S07. The Court of Appeal in
The Coral have lent support to that view of The Miramar, for nothing is made of
the fact that the incorporated clauses made no specific reference to the bill of lading
holders.
The first and boldest argument for the shipowner was that the meaning of clause
8 of the NYPE form was laid down by authority. In Canadian Transport Co. Ltd.
v. Courtline Ltd the House of Lords had held that clause 8 placed both the duty to
perform and the responsibility for stowage on the charterers. 8 It followed that the
owners were not responsible for bad stowage. Thus when the words were removed
4. Mocatta, Mustill and Boyd (eds.) Scrutton on Chanerparties, 19th. ed. (London, 1984) pp.63-65.
5. Supra. at p.5
6. Miramar Maritime Corporation v. Holborn Oil Trading Ltd. [1984] A.C. 676 at p.683; [1984] 2
Lloyd's Rep. 129 and p.134 col.2, Lord Diplock. Lord Diplock said: ' ... this House should take this
opportunity of stating unequivocally that, where in a bill of lading there is included a clause which purports
to incorporate the terms of a specified charter-party, there is not any rule of construction that clauses
in that charter-party which are directly germane to the shipment, carriage or delivery of the goods and
impose obligations on the "charterer" under that designation, are presumed to be incorporated in the
bill of lading with the substitution of ... the designation "consignee of the caro" or "bill oflading holder".'
7. [1984] 2 Lloyd's Rep. p.132 col.2; and p.133 col.2.
8. [1940] A.C. 934; (1940) 67 Lloyd's Rep. 262.
63
THE DENNING LAW JOURNAL
into the bill of lading contract they relieved the shipowner of responsibility for bad
stowage.
The Court of Appeal rejected this argument on the simple ground that the words
did not necessarily bear the same meaning in the context of the bill of lading contract
as they did in the charterparty. This must be right, as it is the very words which
are incorporated into the bill of lading contract, not the meaning which the law has
attributed to them using their original context as a guide to the parties' intentions.9
The same result may be reached by a different route, for Canadian Transport is
authority only for the proposition that clause 8 makes the charterers responsible for
stowage "as between themselves and the shipowners". Indeed Lord Wright goes
on to say, in support of this construction:
"If [the charterers] do not perform properly the duty of stowing the cargo, the
shipowners will be subject to a liability to the bill oflading holders. Justice requires
that the charterers should indemnify the shipowners against that liability ... " .10
The shipowner's other argument in support of their construction met with more
favour. This was that there would be no point in incorporating clause 8 into the bill
oflading contract unle~s it was intended to relieve them ofliability for bad stowage.
It would be unnecessary to include the clause merely to permit the shipowner to delegate
the performance of his duty to stow to the charterer, as he would have a perfect right
to do that in any event. The Court neither approved nor disapproved of this approach
but the implication is that they thought it "arguable".
For their part, the consignees urged that because there was no privity of contract
between them and the charterer, they would have no contractual right of recourse
for bad stowage if the owner's construction were correct, and that this in itselftold
against the owner's construction. The loss of any recourse by the consignee for bad
stowage was a result which the Court was keen to avoid. Beldam L)., suggested
that an answer might be found in the law of agency; the consignee should be held
to have made a contract with the charterer through the agency of the shipowner. It
was said that this argument was first suggested by Devlin J., in Pyrene v. Scindia. II
At all events, this stowage contract would come as a surprise to the principals and
their agent. One object which this argument would have to meet would be that the
shipper will frequently neither know the identity of the charterer nor have sight of
the charterpaty terms until well after the contract of carriage with the shipowner has
been made and the bill of lading signed. Furthermore, the Carriage of Goods By
Sea Act 1992 may well not transfer the benefit (or the burden, ifany) of this stowage
contract to the consignee, who will usually be the party to suffer loss.12
9. Hamilton & Co. v. Mackie & Sons (1889) 5 TLR 677, Lord Esher, M.R. at p.677.
10. Supra, n.8 at p.943.
II. But the question in that case was whether an F.G.B. seller had made a contract of carriage with the
shipowner through the agency of the buyer: [1954] 1 Lloyd's Rep. p.330 col.2
12. The 1992 Act transfers to the lawful holder of a bill of lading "all rights of suit under the contract
of carriage", the contract of carriage being defined as "the contract contained in or evidenced by that
bill of lading": 552(1) and 5(1). The Act does not contemplate a bill of lading evidencing two separate
contracts, one a contract of carriage and the other a contract of stowage.
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Closely related is the suggestion that by performing stowage the charterer impliedly
undertakes a contractual obligation to the shipper to use care and skill. The requisite
intentions to contract seem equally lacking in this case, as does any means of transferring
the benefit of the contract to the consignee.
The Court did not have to decide between these competing arguments but it willl
be seen that in its willingness to find an avenue of recourse (for the shipper) against
the charterer, it leant in favour of the shipowner's construction to some degree.
The consistency issue
If the charterparty clauses survived the meaning hurdle, the consignees sought to
strike them down for inconsistency or incompatibility with the other terms of the
bill of lading contract. The Court rejected an argument (which may have appealed
to Sheen J., in the court below) that the shipowner had undertaken an obligation by
virtue of the Hague-Visby Rules properly and carefully to stow, which obligation
could not be excluded by contract. In reply to this the Court referred to the decision
in Pyrene that the object of the Hague Rules was not to define the scope of the contract
of carriage, but the terms on which such services as were undertaking were to be
performed. 13 Significantly, the Court appears to have rejected the notion that the
Hague- Visby Rules create even a primn fade obligation to load and stow properly
and carefully. They were prepared to accept that such aprimn facie obligation exists
at common law. But the consignees' argument that the charterparty clauses should
be rejected as inconsistent with that implied obligation proved too much - "on that
basis, however clear the term restricting the scope of the services undertaken by the
owner, it would have to be rejected." 14
Comment
Whilst it began life in the High Court as a triumph for consignees, the Court of Appeal
have made The Coral very much an owner's case; and have gone the extra mile in
this direction.
The apparently settled rule in The Miramnr, that verbal manipulation of incorporated
clauses will not be permitted, and that specific reference to bill of lading holders
under that designation would be required to impose an obligation on them, has been
thrown open to doubt, to the extent of that case being cited in support of the contrary
conclusion.
The Court was willing to entertain the possibility that the shipper may have to pursue
an uncertain recourse action against the charterer based on a contract which none
of the parties are likely to have contemplated at the start of the venture, the benefit
of which may well not be transferred to the consignee.
Finally, a significant assumption was made as to the precise effect of the rule in
Pyrene. In that case, Devlin J., had to decide whether the Hague Rules package
limitation applied before the goods had crossed the ship's rail. The cargo owners
13. Supra n.11.
14. The Coral. Supra. at p.7 col.2.
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had relied on Article ill rule 2, which states that' 'the carrier shall properly and carefully
load, handle, stow, carry, keep, care for and discharge the goods carried", as defining
the scope of the application of the Rules; and they contended that their goods had
been damaged outside that scope. Devlin J., rejected this contention on the ground
that Article III rule 2 defined, not the scope of the contract of carriage but the terms
on which it was to be performed. It means that the carrier shall do whatever loading
or stowage he does properly and carefully. The context of Pyrene was thus far removed
from The Coral. Also, there is some evidence in Devlin J.'s judgment that he had
in mind the division of performance of the operations ofloading and stowage between
the owner and shipper, in accordance with the nature of the cargo and practice of
the relevant port. 15 Dividing performance between the carier and the shipper is one
thing; placing responsibility for performance on a third party over whom the shipper
has no control and without responsibility on the part of the carrier is quite another.
If this point is raised again it is to be hoped that this distinction will be explored.
15. Pyrene. supra. n.ll at p.328 co1.2-p.329 col.l: "The extent to which the carrier has to undertake
the loading of the vessel may depend not only upon different systems of law but upon the custom and
practice of the port of loading and the nature of the cargo. It is difficult to believe that the Rules were
intended to impose a universal rigidity in this respect or to deny freedom of contract to the carrier. . . .
I see no reason why the Rules should leave the parties free to determine by their own contract the part
which each has to play."
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